Monday, 18 January 2010

A posthumous victory for John Wilkes

In the last week, events have played out to the tune of justice in Parliament, conducive to the satisfaction of journalists and advocates for the reporting of matters of public interest, which concentrated on the unmasking of Trafigura's allegedly scandalous affairs in corporate conduct. Trafigura, based in London, is an oil trade business that has recently faced allegations against its application of business techniques in a western region of Africa; the claim made by the indigenous, who have reported flu-like symptoms, indicates the belief, on behalf of said citizens, that Trafigura dumped toxic material in the vicinity of their homes. This claim is deadly serious, especially in the sense of positive image, which the oil trader is appearing to fight to uphold through rapid PR initiatives.
But the case of concern, amongst certain MPs, journalists and anyone aware of the established verbatim reporting allowances in Parliamentary discussion, is the attempted injunction, assisted by the Carter-Ruck libel lawyer firm, to prevent such discussed matters being aired out in public. The constitutional right of individuals, groups and companies to withhold information deemed private and confidential is widely acknowledged, and defended by libel law in court. But the Trafigura case is special. Why is it special? It is special because of the lengths to which this company has gone to retain questions asked in Parliament by Labour MP Paul Farrelly about the contents of the confidential Minton report, which relates to the toxic waste dumping situation in Africa.
The so-called 'super-injunction' obtained by Carter-Ruck, after issue of a ban on the Guardian from reporting both content of the Minton report and the actuality of the injunction was confirmed in court, was potentially damaging to the rights of journalists to report proceedings in Parliament and the public's right to hear of such constitutional debate. A common form of libel defence by journalists, in relation to official bodies like Parliament and the workings of these bodies, is qualified privilege, which intends to affirm a journalist's right to report on such important matters, which are of public interest, as long as they are verbatim - accurate, and thus fair in other words.
An article written this week by the editor of the Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, notes the awkward stances on which these super-injunctions are founded. The very nature of such intensive injunctions is to fortify and conceal the existence of court proceedings and court orders, so that the interests of the company, or any other subject of the injunction, are protected from external review. Rusbridger's 'Comment & Debate' column in the Guardian's Thursday issue illuminates as to how a combination of journalistic efforts and the online camaraderie of 'tweeters' on Twitter composed a united front against the demanding nature of the Trafigura super-injunction. In the last paragraph of his column he cites the radical idol of the late 1700s, John Wilkes, who fought to make MPs concede to journalists the right to publish accounts of parliamentary debates. So in regards to the journalistic radicalism of John Wilkes, this recent conflict between privacy of affairs and the journalist's right to advocate the public interest, as well as the right to reveal elusive problems, serves as a warning to those who may aim for future attempts at obstructing the flow of freedom of expression in the press.

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